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Abstract 
 This essay analyzes the shifting hard power capabilities of the nineteen states in the G-20 from 
1991-2011, to compare the competing “declinist” and “anti-declinist” hypotheses.  Hard power refers to 
the quantifiable resources a state has, such as military forces or money, as opposed to soft power, 
which is a relational power to convince others to act in a certain way. The declinist hypothesis, 
exemplified by such authors as Christopher Layne and Arvind Subramanian, argues that the United 
States is in rapid decline compared to states such as China, India, Brazil, and others, as seen through a 
smaller gap in power between the United States and its closest competitor in 2011 as compared to 
1991. The anti-declinist hypothesis, demonstrated by authors such as Michael Beckley and Josef Joffe, 
holds that the United States is either more powerful or as powerful in 2011 as it was in 1991. 
 The specific arguments of both declinists and anti-declinists are evaluated, and while this essay 
finds that the declinist hypothesis is more accurate than the anti-declinist one, the declinist literature 
overestimates the extent of the decline. Ultimately, this essay finds that the United States has declined 
sharply compared to China, but is still the supreme power in the world, as it is more powerful than both 
China and Russia, the second and third powers (respectively), put together.  
 This conclusion is reached through the construction and application of a multivariable hard 
power formula, which takes into account scholarly insights into the nature and analysis of power, and 
which is built upon the work of other scholars in the field. This work makes a contribution to the overall 
field of International Relations by refining and updating the previous scholarship and applying it to a 
pressing issue in the field. 
 At the end, this work considers several other alternative hypotheses, such as the Rise of the 
Rest, which argues that many non-Western states are about to join the ranks of the Western powers, 
and finds that these alternative hypotheses are not very accurate. Many states are rising slightly, 
especially China, but the overall distribution of hard power in the world still greatly favors the traditional 
Western Great Powers, such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan.  
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The Decline of the West and the Rise of the Rest? 
An Analysis of Hard Power Capabilities in the G-20 from 1991-2011 
 
Introduction 
 In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a chorus of voices pronounced “the end 
of history” and a new world order, one where the world was dominated solely by the United States.1 
There were opposing voices arguing that the unipolar world, with a sole superpower in control, would 
not last long, but these voices were in the minority.2 Following the devastating 2007 worldwide financial 
crisis, however, a growing group of academics, commentators, and politicians have claimed that the 
post-Cold War order is over and that the world is now approaching a “post post-Cold War” order.3 These 
voices can be roughly organized under the title “declinists”, and are opposed to the “anti-declinists” 
who argue instead that the United States is still the most powerful state by far and will remain so for 
quite some time.4 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History and the Last Man” (1992); and Charles Krauthammer, 
“The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs – America and the World, 1990, special issue, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990/91), 
p25-33 
2
 See, for example, Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International 
Security, Vol. 17, No 4 (Spring 1993), p5-51; and Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” 
International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p44-79 
3 For examples of prominent declinist works, see Christopher Layne, “This Time It’s Real: The end of 
Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, International Studies Quarterly 56 (2012), p203-213; Martin 
Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World 
(New York: Penguin, 2009); Robert A. Pape, “Empire Falls,” National Interest, No. 99 (January/February 2009), 
pp. 21–34; Gideon Rachman, “American Decline: This Time It’s for Real,” Foreign Policy, No. 184 (January/February 
2011), pp. 59–65; Arvind Subramanian “The Inevitable Superpower: Why China’s Rise Is A Sure thing” Foreign 
Affairs, Vol 90, No 5 (Sep/Oct 2011); and Gideon Rachman, “American Decline: This Time It’s for Real,” Foreign 
Policy,No. 184 (January/February 2011), pp. 59–65.  
4
 For examples of prominent anti-declinist works, see Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will 
Endure,” International Security Vol 36, No 3 (Winter 2011/12), p41-78; Joseph Nye The Future of Power (2011); 
Daniel Drezner, “China Isn’t Beating the U.S.,” Foreign Policy, No. 184 (January/February 2011) p67; Joseph Joffe, 
The Myth of America’s Decline (2013); and Edward Luttwak, “The Declinists, Wrong Again,” American Interest, Vol 
4, No 2 (November/December 2008), p7-13.  
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 As many anti-declinists have argued, the arguments of the declinists are nothing new. In 1988, 
the great political scientist Samuel Huntington noted that the United States was in its “fifth wave of 
declinism since the 1950s.”5 The first wave came about in 1957, following the Soviet Union’s launch of 
Sputnik, and the Soviet Union would be the chief threat to the United States for the remainder of the 
Cold War.6 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, while still concerned about the Soviet Union, Americans 
started to also worry about Japan, as argued in books with titles such as Japan as Number One 
(published in 1979).7 While those earlier declinist worries look misguided now, with the benefit of 
hindsight, the current wave of declinists argue that “this time it’s for real,” as China, India, Brazil, and 
others, “will keep rolling forward, no matter what obstacles lie in [their] path,”8 presumably leaving the 
United States far behind. 
 The declinist works are mostly similar in the certainty of their predictions. Famed economist 
Arvind Subramanian declared emphatically in 2011 that “China’s dominance is a sure thing” and is “in 
some ways… already here,” while journalist Gideon Rachman stated in the same year that “sheer size 
and economic momentum mean that the Chinese juggernaut will keep rolling forward.”9 Scholar 
Christopher Layne, who has been arguing since 1993 that the United States’ position was only 
temporary, argued in 2012 that “the era of American ascendancy in international politics… is fast 
winding down” and that “the Great Recession has vindicated the so-called declinists of [the 1980s].”10 
Wu Xinbo, a professor at Fudan University, echoes Layne, arguing that “the global financial crisis 
underscored… the evolution of the international power structure” and that the unipolar moment of the 
                                                          
5
 Samuel Huntington, “The U.S. – Decline or Renewal?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Winter 1988/89). 
6
 Josef Joffe, “Declinism’s Fifth Wave”, The American Interest, 9 December 2011 
7
 Ezra Vogel Japan As Number One: Lessons for America (1980) 
8 Gideon Rachman, “American Decline: This Time It’s for Real,” Foreign Policy, No. 184 (January/February 2011), 
pp. 59–65 
9
 Arvind Subramanian “The Inevitable Superpower: Why China’s Rise Is A Sure thing” Foreign Affairs, Vol 90, No 5 
(Sep/Oct 2011); Gideon Rachman, “American Decline: This Time It’s for Real,” Foreign Policy, 
No. 184 (January/February 2011), pp. 59–65 
10
 Christopher Layne, “This Time It’s Real: The end of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, International Studies 
Quarterly 56 (2012), p203-213 
Gallagher 4 
 
 
1990s “is now gone.”11 Robert Pape, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, goes 
further, arguing that the United States is experiencing “unprecedented decline” that is “extraordinary” 
and “one of the most significant declines of any state since the mid-nineteenth century.”12  
There are other declinist voices, but the quoted ones are some of the louder ones, and do well 
to exemplify the declinist hypothesis: the United States’ power is now at its lowest period since 1991 
and will rapidly be surpassed by China and “The Rest,” a nebulous group of states including Brazil and 
India, and perhaps others. This essay attempts to empirically assess the accuracy of this hypothesis, by 
examining national power trends from 1991 to 2011 among the nineteenth states of the G-20. An 
empirically-based index of power will be constructed and analyzed, to determine if the United States is 
truly in “extraordinary” decline, or if the alternative view of the anti-declinists is correct, and the United 
States retains or has expanded the significant gap in power between it and its nearest rival that it 
possessed at the end of the Cold War in 1991.  
This essay starts out by exploring what power is and how scholars have attempted to measure it 
before then delineating a new formula to measure the power of states. The data for this formula will be 
shown and explained, before an analysis of the declinist versus anti-declinist hypotheses, followed by 
the examination of several other rival hypotheses regarding power trends since 1991.  
Power: What is it and How is it Measured? 
  While power is one of the most central concepts of International Relations, it is also one of the 
most contested ones, both in terms of what it is and in how to measure it. The eminent Hans 
Morgenthau wrote that “the concept of political power poses one of the most difficult and controversial 
                                                          
11
 Wu Xinbo, “Understanding the Geopolitical Implications of the Global Financial Crisis,” Washington Quarterly, 
Vol. 33, No. 4 (October 2010), pp. 155–163; 
12
 Robert A. Pape, “Empire Falls,” National Interest, No. 99 (January/February 2009), pp. 21–34 
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problems of political science,” Joseph Nye noted that “no one definition is accepted by all who use the 
word,” and Robert Gilpin felt that the “number and variety of definitions should be an embarrassment 
to political scientists.”13 At its core, however, power is some sort of ability to make or resist change, or 
to achieve goals despite others’ pushback – the classical definition being Robert Dahl’s, wherein “A has 
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”14 This 
general concept is often tied to such terms as “influence, control, coercion, force, persuasion, 
deterrence, compellence, inducement, and so on,” and is viewed as the common element “underlying 
all such terms.” 15 
 Power as a concept is often divided into several different types, and the analysis of power is 
often divided into several different approaches. The two prominent approaches to analyzing power are 
the classical “power-as-resources” approach and the relatively newer and relatively post-modern 
“relational power” approach.  
 Power itself is often divided into three different types: hard, soft, and smart. Hard power is the 
type of power that is analyzed by the “power-as-resources” approach and is the power provided by 
tangible and quantifiable resources such as military forces and money. Soft power is better analyzed by 
the “relational power” approach and is the ability to affect others through attracting, co-opting, setting 
the agenda, and persuading. Smart power is “the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into 
effective strategies,” and is very subjectively analyzed, as seen by the normative use of “smart” in its 
title.16 
                                                          
13
 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1948; Joseph Nye, The Future of Power, 2011; and Robert Gilpin US 
Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment, 1975 
14
 Robert Dahl, “The Concept of Power”, Behavioral Science, 2:3 (July 1957).  
15
 Doug Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations, Edited by Walter 
Carsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (2013).  
16
 Nye, Future of Power (2011) 
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“Power-as-resources” is at the base of “balance of power” theory, wherein it is assumed that it 
is “possible to add up the various elements of national power, sometimes called ‘power resources’ or 
‘capabilities’, in order to calculate the power distribution among the Great Powers.” This is the classical 
approach to studying power and continues to be the traditional method used by many analysts, 
including the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends reports.17 
 The “relational power” approach to analyzing power is often regarded as being first started in 
1950, with the publication of Power and Society by Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan.18 According to 
this approach, power is not a property or capability held by states, but rather it “is an actual or potential 
relationship between two or more actors.”19 Thus, the relational approach does not simply say that a 
state “has power,” but rather that a state “has power over X,” where X can be another state or another 
actor. While this is an interesting approach to analyzing power, it unfortunately “makes it difficult to add 
up the various dimensions in order to arrive at some overall estimate of an actor’s power.”20 
This essay takes the “power-as-resources” approach of measuring hard power to analyze the 
declinist versus anti-declinist argument, but in a form modified by the insight of the “relational power” 
approach and in a unique way. The traditional way of taking the “power-as-resources” approach was 
often to focus on a single-variable that could be measured across time between many different states.21 
Examples of studied variables include gross military expenditures, the size of naval forces, GNP, and 
                                                          
17
 Classic texts advocating this approach include Nicholas Spykman, American Strategy and World Politics: The 
United States and the balance of Power (1942); Harold Sprout and Marget Sprout (editors of) Foundations of 
National Power (1945); Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1948); and Edward Gulick Europe’s Classical 
Balance of Power (1955). The most recent National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends Report is 2030: Alternative 
Worlds (2010) and may be found at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-
council-global-trends 
18
 This was the “watershed” moment in power analysis, according to Doug Baldwin in Handbook of International 
Relations, Carlsnaes et al (2013) 
19
 Baldwin, Handbook of International Relations (2013) 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 The paragraphs on past ways of measuring “power-as-resources” is drawn considerably from Ashley Tellis et al., 
Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age (2000) chapter 3  
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gross consumption of energy.22 While these single-variable indicators were used by many due to their 
simplicity and ease of use, they have been criticized by many scholars for being too simplistic. These 
criticisms led to the development of multivariable approaches to measuring national power, which is the 
starting point of this essay’s approach. 
The first “complex nonlinear multivariable index” for measuring national power was developed 
in 1960 by Clifford German, who produced a formula as follows: 
G = national power = N (L + P + I + M), 
where N is nuclear capability, L is land, P is population, I is the industrial base, and M is military size.23 
German was followed by several others, including Wilhelm Fucks in 1965, J David Singer in 1972, Wayne 
Ferris in 1973, and Ray Cline in 1975.24 Cline’s system “won a wide readership both in academia and 
within the defense community, and some variants of it were used to develop the U.S. Army’s estimates 
of long-range trends in the international system;” it is also the intellectual basis for the National 
Intelligence Council’s Global Trends reports.25 This essay is built on a variant of Cline’s insightful formula, 
modified to better accommodate the world of the 21st century and utilize the insight of the “relational 
power” approach to analyzing power. 
                                                          
22
 For approaches using gross military expenditures, see Norman Alcock and Alan Newcombe, “The Perception of 
Naval  Power,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 14 (1970), p335-343; for the size of naval forces, see George 
Modelski and William Tompson, Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1983 (1987); for GNP see Charles Hitch and 
Roland McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (1960); and for gross consumption of energy, see 
Bruce Russett, “Is There a Long-Run Trend Towards Concentration in the International System?” Comparative 
Political Studies, Vol. 1 (1968) p103-122 and Oskar Morgenstein et al., Long Term Projections of Political and 
Military Power (1973). 
23
 Clifford German, “A Tentative Evaluation of World Power”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4 (1960), p138-144 
24
 Wilhelm Fucks, Formeln zur Macht: Prognosen uber Volker, Wirtschaft Potentiale (1965); J. David Singer et al., 
“Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major-Power War,” in Bruce Russett (editor) Peace, War and Numbers 
(1972), p19-48; Wayne Ferris, The Power Capabilities of Nation-States (1973), p58; and Ray Cline World Power 
Assessment (1975) and The Power of Nations in the 1990s: A Strategic Assessment (1975). 
25
 Tellis et al. Measuring National Power in a Postindustrial Age (2000). 
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 In 2000, RAND Corporation published a report on power titled Measuring Power in a 
Postindustrial Age. In it, the authors explain that, “since the late 1970s, no new attempts at developing 
aggregate power measures” like the ones of German and Cline “have materialized… in part because such 
aggregate measures have been perceived as having reached the limits of their success.”26 Instead, most 
scholars have focused on examining states through one-to-one comparisons, looking at how the states 
match up on several quantifiable indicators, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP growth, and 
military expenditure, as well as on more qualitative indicators, such as the ability to attract allies or the 
ability to pass “important” legislation.27 While such one-to-one comparisons and attention to qualitative 
indicators are necessary for a judgment of which state is “more powerful” in the relational sense (i.e. 
which state can influence the other state more), the aggregate indicator model is of great use in 
analyzing broad power trends over time, which is what the declinist versus anti-declinist debate revolves 
around.  
The Power Formula 
Cline’s Formula 
As mentioned above, this essay’s analysis of power starts with Cline’s formula. Cline’s formula 
was as follows: 
Pp = (C + E + M) (S + W) 
                                                          
26
 Ibid. 
27
 The one notable exception to this trend is the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends reports, which looks 
at an aggregate of GDP, defense spending, population, and “technology,” which is measured by GDP per capita. 
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where C is critical mass, E is economic capacity, M is military capacity, S is the national strategy 
coefficient, and W is the national will.28 Cline’s formula gave a weighting of 20% to Critical Mass, 40% to 
Economic Capacity, and 40% to Military Capacity, which is the roughly the same weighting this essay 
uses.29 One of the crucial insights Cline provided was that each variable had to be weighted itself, 
wherein a country such as the United States would not receive, for example, $15 trillion “points” for its E 
score, but would rather get a score of 100 for having the largest GDP, while the other states’ scores 
would follow. This is because, as the “relational power” theorists noted, power is a relative concept. It 
makes no sense to speak of a country being powerful without reference to another country that is 
powerless. As Morgenthau points out, it is worthless to say that a country is more powerful than it used 
to be and present a number of statistics showing this – what matters is not how a country has changed 
in relation to itself, but in relation to others.30 
Cline gave a very rough relative weighting system for each variable, giving, for example, the 
United States a score of 10 for a GNP that was double the Soviet Union’s, which he gave 8.31 This essay 
attempts to be more precise, giving the largest score on a given measure (with one exception) 100 
points, and using that as the basis for assigning the other scores. For example, in regards to population, 
in 2011 China had a population of 1,344,130,000, while the United States’ population was 311,587,816. 
                                                          
28
 Note that while critical mass is often used in reference to nuclear material, Cline uses it for population and land 
size. This essay has changed this segment of power to “Base”, to reduce confusion. Note also that while the 
national strategy and national will are clearly important in understanding the total power of a state, they are 
relatively un-quantifiable, which leads to possibly misleading results – e.g. Cline wrote in 1975 that while the 
United States was more quantifiably powerful than the Soviet Union, the national strategy and national will in the 
Soviet Union was much stronger than the United States, leading to a much more powerful state (he gave the 
Soviet Union 67.5 points, compared to the United States’ 35points. China interestingly had 23 points. This essay 
does not include such coefficients, and is much more specific and direct in its focus on relative hard power 
capacity, as opposed to the overall power potential that Cline focused on. 
29
 This essay’s formula has moved 10% of military capacity to innovation capacity, leaving military capacity 30% of 
the total end score. Unfortunately, Cline did not provide an explanation for why exactly he chose the weighting he 
did. It may strike some as unwise to thus built upon his work, but Merritt and Zinnes, in “Alternative Indexes of 
National Power” in Richard Stoll and Michael Ward (eds.), Power in World Politics, (1988), determined that 
changing the weightings did not significantly change the end results. See also Tellis et al. Measuring National 
Power in the PostIndustrial Age (2001), chapter 3. 
30
 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1948) 
31
 Cline, World Power Assessment (1975) 
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In this case, China receives a score of 100, for having the largest population, while the United States 
receives a score of 23, for having 23% the population of China. 
  
Relative Hard Power Capacity: RHPC 
The overall formula of this essay takes its overall structure from Cline, but is slightly more 
complex than his. The formula is: 
Relative Hard Power Capacity (RHPC) = Base (B) + Economy (E) + Innovation (I) + Military (M) 
It is relative because the scores are weighted according to each state’s place compared to other states, 
and it is hard power capacity, because it is looking at the resources that a state has under its control, 
that it can marshal in a time of war.  
The formula has fourteen different input variables, which are divided into the four key 
foundations of Base, Economy, Innovation, and Military. Each foundational variable is determined in its 
own way.  
B = [(Weighted Land + Weighted Population + Weighted Agricultural Land) / 150] 
E = Weighted GDP + Weighted GDP Per Capita + ([Weighted Services Value Added + Weighted 
Manufacturing Value Added + Weighted Market Capitalization + Weighted Foreign Direct Investment] / 
2) 
I changes over time, as more data are available in 2011 than in 1991. However, it is always the 
weighted score of the available Innovation variables. In 1991 and 1992 it is only Patent Applications; in 
1997 and 2002 it is [(Patent Applications + Research and Development Spending) / 200]; and in 2007 and 
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2011 it is [(Patent Applications + Research and Development Spending + Intellectual Property Receipts) / 
300]. 
M = 2(Military Spending) + Weighted Nuclear Warheads 
All-together, B is worth a 200 points, E is worth 400 points, I is worth 100 points, and M is worth a total 
300 points, for a total of 1000 possible points.  
While there certainly are legitimate worries regarding complex multivariable formulas, the 
mathematics of this formula are relatively straightforward. This formula will provide a uniform 
assessment of power over a long period of time, to better analyze the declinist versus anti-declinist 
debate. If the declinist hypothesis is correct, then the data should show a smaller gap in total RHPC 
between the United States and the second state in 2011 than in 1991. If the anti-declinist hypothesis is 
correct, then the data should show the same or a larger gap in total score in 2011 than in 1991. 
The Data 
 In this section, all of the data is presented, in both table and graph form, with accompanying 
paragraphs describing the importance of each variable and describing the observable changes. While 
political science has indeed shown that variations in distribution across states matter, this essay takes 
the Neo-Realist assumption that states are a single “black box” holistic unit. With this assumption, the 
state is viewed as a unified whole and the internal distribution of capabilities is not considered, for the 
sake of simplicity. For this reason, while the G-20 includes nineteen states and the European Union, this 
essay will not examine the EU, as the EU is, at the time of writing, still far too divided to view as a 
singular unit, especially when it comes to foreign affairs, one of the paramount areas of concern for hard 
power. 
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Base: Land and People 
 “Base” is the various basic foundations that any state needs to possess to have power, i.e. land 
and population.32 It is from people and land that everything else a state possesses is quite literally built 
on, and it is the ultimate foundation of all hard power capacity.33 It is interesting to note that base 
scores do not vary much over time, as major states have not gained or lost great amounts of land in the 
period observed, and few countries have had runaway population growth or decline. The major change 
for most countries in regards to base score is a change in agricultural land, as states put more or less 
effort into increasing this. 
Population:  
 The population is simply the number of people who live in a state.  This is clearly a critical part of 
a state’s power, as a state without people is not a state. While it is certainly true that population is not 
everything, and a large population brings a great number of complications, a large population is often 
seen as a key part of the hard power of a country. As Morgenthau wrote, “no country can remain or 
become a first-rate power which does not belong to the more populous nations of the earth,” as it is 
through a large population that most countries can have large economies, large armies, and so forth.34 
 Table 1 shows the total population of permanent residents of the state, while Table 2 shows the 
weighted value of that population relative to the others. There has been little change in relative 
population sizes over the period surveyed, with China having the largest population at all times. Most 
other countries have gone up slightly in relativity, due to their own growth outpacing China’s, but 
Russia, Germany, and Japan have all gone down moderately. While Germany and Japan have gone down 
only in relative size, Russia has actually had an absolute decline as well, a trend which could prove 
                                                          
32
 All figures on population and land are taken from the World Bank Database. 
33
 Even small but powerful countries such as Brunei or Qatar have their power built on land, as it is the land that 
holds the petroleum that has made them rich. 
34
 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1948) 
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disastrous if not reversed. The biggest change is from India, which has gone from a weighting of 77 to 
91, as their growth has picked up dramatically compared to the other states. Figure 1, in particular, 
shows just how far ahead of everybody else China and India are in terms of population. 
Table 1, Population, Permanent Residents
35
 
Population, 
People 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 35,933,108 36,690,739 40,926,063 43.6milion 48,257,282 50,586,757 
U.S. 252,981,000 256,514,000 272,657,000 287.4 301,231,207 311,587,816 
Canada 28,171,682 28,519,597 29,987,200 31.3 32,927,517 34,483,975 
Mexico 87,890,094 89,757,916 98,968,558 101.7 113,529,819 119,361,233 
Brazil 152,153,539 154,597,985 166,925,457 173.8 189,996,976 196,935,134 
Argentina 33,075,194 33,520,803 35,690,778 36.5 39,331,357 40,728,738 
China 1,150,780,000 1,164,970,000 1,230,075,000 1280.7 1,317,885,000 1,344,130,000 
Japan 123,921,000 124,229,000 126,091,000 127.4 127,770,750 127,817,277 
South Korea 43,268,000 43,663,000 45,954,000 48.4 48,598,000 49,779,000 
India 886,348,712 903,749,636 990,460,131 1049.5 1,159,095,250 1,221,156,319 
Indonesia 181,786,329 184,916,848 200,050,444 217 230,972,808 243,801,639 
Russia 148,624,000 148,689,000 147,304,000 143.5 142,100,000 142,960,000 
Turkey 54,911,233 55,815,175 60,372,413 67.3 69,496,513 73,058,638 
Germany 80,013,896 80,624,598 82,034,771 82.4 82,266,372 81,797,673 
France 58,557,072 58,849,212 59,963,792 59.5 64,012,572 65,371,613 
UK 57,424,897 57,580,402 58,316,954 60.2 60,986,649 62,752,472 
Italy 56,758,521 56,797,087 56,890,372 58.1 59,375,289 60,723,569 
Saudi Arabia 16,739,895 17,263,613 19,060,850 24 25,915,624 27,761,728 
Australia 17,284,000 17,495,000 18,517,000 19.7 21,015,900 22,323,900 
 
Table 2, Population, Weighted Score 
Population, 
Weighted 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
U.S. 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 
Canada 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Mexico 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Brazil 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 
Argentina 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
China 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Japan 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
                                                          
35
 To maintain a fixed listing of countries throughout this essay, the countries are ordered by alphabet, by 
continent: Africa, then America (North), then America (South), and so on.  
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South Korea 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
India 0.77 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.88 0.91 
Indonesia 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Russia 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Turkey 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Germany 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 
France 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
UK 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Italy 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Saudi Arabia 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Australia 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
 
Figure 1, Weighted Population Size 
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Total Land: 
 The second variable in Base is that of total land. Land is vital for countless reasons, and it is no 
surprise that the eight largest countries on Earth are all members of the G-20, at the time of writing.36 
While there are many small countries that are powerful, such as Qatar, and many large countries that 
are weak, such as Sudan, it is clear that land is often a critical component of hard power, due to the 
accompanying national resources, space for large populations, and diverse ecosystems.  
Table 3, Land, Square Kilometers 
Land, Sq. 
Km 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South 
Africa 1,213,090.00 1,213,090.00 1,213,090.00 1,213,090.00 1,213,090.00 1,213,090.00 
U.S. 9,158,960.00 9,158,960.00 9,158,960.00 9,161,920.00 9,161,920.00 9,147,420.00 
Canada 9,093,510.00 9,093,510.00 9,093,510.00 9,093,510.00 9,093,510.00 9,093,510.00 
Mexico 1,943,950.00 1,943,950.00 1,943,950.00 1,943,950.00 1,943,950.00 1,943,950.00 
Brazil 8,459,420.00 8,459,420.00 8,459,420.00 8,459,420.00 8,459,420.00 8,459,420.00 
Argentina 2,736,690.00 2,736,690.00 2,736,690.00 2,736,690.00 2,736,690.00 2,736,690.00 
China 9,327,420.00 9,327,420.00 9,327,480.00 9,327,487.00 9,327,489.20 9,327,489.90 
Japan 364,600.00 364,600.00 364,500.00 364,500.00 364,500.00 364,500.00 
South 
Korea 98,730.00 98,730.00 98,730.00 96,790.00 96,920.00 97,100.00 
India 2,973,190.00 2,973,190.00 2,973,190.00 2,973,190.00 2,973,190.00 2,973,190.00 
Indonesia 1,811,570.00 1,811,570.00 1,811,570.00 1,811,570.00 1,811,570.00 1,811,570.00 
Russia 16,389,950.00 16,389,950.00 16,378,650.00 16,380,940.00 16,377,740.00 16,376,870.00 
Turkey 769,630.00 769,630.00 769,630.00 769,630.00 769,630.00 769,630.00 
Germany 349,130.00 349,130.00 349,050.00 348,860.00 348,670.00 348,570.00 
France 547,670.00 547,670.00 547,670.00 547,670.00 547,660.00 547,660.00 
UK 241,930.00 241,930.00 241,930.00 241,930.00 241,930.00 241,930.00 
Italy 294,110.00 294,110.00 294,110.00 294,110.00 294,140.00 294,140.00 
Saudi 
Arabia 2,149,690.00 2,149,690.00 2,149,690.00 2,149,690.00 2,149,690.00 2,149,690.00 
Australia 7,682,300.00 7,682,300.00 7,682,300.00 7,682,300.00 7,682,300.00 7,682,300.00 
 
                                                          
36
 At the time of writing, it is quite plausible that Russia may be kicked out of the G-8 for its annexation of Crimea, 
and it is at least possible they will be kicked out of the G-20 as well. 
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Table 4, Land, Weighted Score 
Land, 
weighted 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South 
Africa 
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
U.S. 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Canada 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Mexico 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Brazil 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Argentina 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
China 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Japan 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
South 
Korea 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
India 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Indonesia 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Russia 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Turkey 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Germany 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
France 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
UK 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Italy 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Australia 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 
 
While there have been minor absolute changes in the amount of land, they have been so minor that 
there has been no relative changes. Thus, these totals are the same across the time surveyed, and no 
graph is shown. 
Agricultural Land: 
 While land is valuable for a host of reasons, there are many types of land that are not very 
useful. For example, while some desert land has oil beneath it, other parts seem to merely have sand, 
which does not bring as much benefit to a state. Some of the most important land a country can possess 
is agricultural land. This is land that is arable, cultivated, and under permanent pasture. Because of the 
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unique ability of agricultural land to provide sustenance to a population, this is treated as the final part 
of a state’s base power. 
Table 5, Agricultural Land, Square Kilometers 
Agricultural, 
sq. km 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 960,050 964,730 979,450 980,280 968,900 963,740 
U.S. 4,269,480 4,254,290 4,148,850 4,130,640 4,128,576 4,112,625 
Canada 677,530 678,140 679,440 675,170 652,824 625,970 
Mexico 1,045,000 1,052,000 1,072,000 1,049,000 1,023,810 1,031,660 
Brazil 2,449,410 2,467,090 2,595,660 2,658,680 2,710,816 2,750,300 
Argentina 1,276,600 1,277,550 1,282,350 1,287,100 1,440,330 1,475,480 
China 5,108,960 5,159,980 5,241,870 5,231,970 5,154,000 5,191,482 
Japan 56,540 56,150 53,540 47,630 46,500 45,610 
South Korea 21,610 21,360 19,830 19,190 18,400 17,560 
India 1,811,400 1,809,400 1,808,560 1,800,370 1,797,090 1,797,990 
Indonesia 415,240 413,510 427,220 468,810 510,000 545,000 
Russia 2,216,310 2,216,310 2,179,890 2,166,510 2,154,630 2,152,500 
Turkey 400,670 399,040 392,420 411,960 395,050 382,470 
Germany 171,360 169,510 173,270 169,670 169,500 167,190 
France 304,260 303,310 299,600 295,550 294,180 290,900 
UK 181,430 180,700 175,850 169,760 176,470 171,640 
Italy 160,540 159,780 153,450 152,730 141,620 139,326 
Saudi Arabia 1,236,720 1,237,460 1,737,850 1,737,930 1,736,750 1,733,550 
Australia 4,629,740 4,661,780 4,622,000 4,470,000 4,254,490 4,096,726 
 
Table 6, Agricultural Land, Weighted Score 
Agricultural, 
weighted 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
U.S. 0.84 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.8 0.79 
Canada 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 
Mexico 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Brazil 0.48 0.48 0.5 0.51 0.53 0.53 
Argentina 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.28 
China 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Japan 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 
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Indonesia 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.1 
Russia 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.41 
Turkey 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 
Germany 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
France 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
UK 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Italy 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Saudi Arabia 0.24 0.24 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 
Australia 0.91 0.9 0.88 0.85 0.83 0.79 
 
 
Figure 2, Weighted Agricultural Land 
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Total Base: 
Put together, population, land, and agricultural land make up the base of a state. Adding up the 
weighted scores together, we get the total base: 
Table 7, Total Base Score 
Total Base 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
U.S. 160 158 157 157 159 158 
Canada 69 69 71 73 71 71 
Mexico 39 39 40 39 41 41 
Brazil 111 111 116 115 119 120 
Argentina 44 44 44 44 48 48 
China 255 255 257 256 257 257 
Japan 14 14 13 13 13 13 
South Korea 5 5 5 5 5 5 
India 129 130 134 135 141 144 
Indonesia 35 35 35 37 39 39 
Russia 156 156 155 152 153 152 
Turkey 18 18 17 18 18 17 
Germany 12 12 12 11 11 11 
France 14 14 14 14 14 14 
UK 10 10 9 9 9 9 
Italy 10 10 10 10 10 10 
South Africa 29 29 29 29 30 30 
Saudi Arabia 38 38 48 48 49 48 
Australia 138 137 137 132 132 128 
 
All in all, there have been little changes in base scores since 1991, as Figure 3 shows clearly. This is to be 
expected for a “foundation.” 
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Figure 3, Total Base 
 
Economy 
While a large amount of land and people is important, it is not absolutely determinative of great 
power. What matters is what the people can do on their land. If the base is the foundation of hard 
power, the economy is the threshold that everything else is built upon. Wealth allows a state to build a 
large military, design and manufacture innovative weaponry, buy luxury goods produced elsewhere, buy 
food cultivated elsewhere, and even bribe other states or close down markets in an act of economic 
statecraft.  
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GDP 
 The GDP, the market value of all officially recognized goods and services produced in a state, is 
one of the most important indicators available when it comes to national power, but it is important to 
not make the mistake of viewing it as synonymous with said power. A large GDP is evidence of a large 
market, clearly, but it does not necessarily mean that a country is wealthy. The population of a large 
country could, for instance, produce a great amount of food, but then consume it all to stay alive. Thus, 
as many anti-declinists have noted, China actually had the world’s largest GDP during the 18th century, 
but it was of course one of the least powerful countries in existence, as the West trampled over it.37 
However, that said, it should not be simply disregarded. A large GDP, combined with other signs of 
economic strength, is a crucial emblem of economic power. GDP has been chosen over GNI due to the 
fact that GDP is of the state’s production capacity, not just the nationals of the state, which may be 
contributing to the productive capacity of a different state on the other side of the globe. 
As Table 8 shows, all countries have had strong growth in constant dollars. This is the base of 
the declinist argument, where they point out the slow growth of the United States (263%) and the manic 
growth of China (2170%). Besides China, the other BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have had 
extreme growth as well: Brazil’s GDP growing 553%, India’s 672%, and Russia’s 396%.38 In comparison, 
besides the United States, the other Western countries growth has also been presented as anemic, with 
Canada at 305%, the UK at 212%, France at 201%, Germany at 189%, and Italy at 168%. 
True enough, as the declinists say, in relative terms China has skyrocketed. In 1991 their GDP 
was a mere 6% that of the United States; in 2011 it was 51%. However, the other BRICs have not had as 
much growth, with Brazil going from 7% to 14%, India from 4% to 11%, and Russia from 8% to 12%. 
                                                          
37
 For historical GDP data, see Angus Maddison, Statistics on World Population, GDP, and Per Capita 
GDP, 1–2008AD, http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm. 
38
 South Africa has recently been added to the BRICS, moving the S from lowercase to upper; while its GDP is not 
even half a trillion dollars, the others are all near or over two trillion. 
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While this is extremely strong growth, it pales in comparison to China’s. It is true that the Western 
European allies of the United States have gone down slightly in relative GDP, but this is only because 
their growth has not been as strong as the United States. The only real big changes have been the 
decline of Japan and the rise of China. However, as of 2011, China was actually further away from 
America than Japan had been in 1991. Clearly this will change as China continues to grow, but given the 
historical perspective it certainly is not as impressive as it may sound when viewed merely from GDP 
growth. The United States, in actuality, is still far above everyone else. So far, in fact, that to actually be 
able to make out the GDP changes of the countries besides China and Japan, an additional graph 
removing the United States completely has been added. These data certainly show a leveling of the GDP 
field, but the GDP is not the only mark of the strength of an economy.   
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Table 9, GDP, Weighted 
GDP, 
Weighted 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South 
Africa 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
U.S. 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Canada 0.1 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.1 0.11 
Mexico 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Brazil 0.07 0.06 0.1 0.05 0.09 0.14 
Argentina 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 
China 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.24 0.51 
Japan 0.57 0.59 0.5 0.36 0.3 0.37 
South 
Korea 
0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 
India 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.11 
Indonesia 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 
Russia 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.12 
GDP, 
Current $ 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South 
Africa 120,225,332,339 130,513,031,863 148,814,165,965 111,100,858,130 286,171,830,700 384,312,674,446 
U.S. 6,174,000,000,000 6,539,300,000,000 8,608,500,000,000 10,980,200,000,000 14,480,300,000,000 16,244,600,000,000 
Canada 598,208,082,395 579,531,728,303 637,536,472,627 734,661,951,188 1,424,065,729,448 1,821,424,139,311 
Mexico 314,453,895,612 363,609,268,789 486,229,121,799 750,477,694,898 1,043,459,078,120 1,178,126,184,343 
Brazil 407,337,832,905 390,566,551,484 871,200,342,860 504,221,228,974 1,366,853,244,424 2,252,664,120,777 
Argentina 189,719,989,668 228,779,382,768 292,859,000,000 102,040,286,874 260,768,703,249 475,501,675,473 
China 379,468,656,246 422,660,918,111 952,652,693,079 1,453,827,554,714 3,494,055,944,791 8,227,102,629,831 
Japan 3,536,800,942,895 3,852,794,371,594 4,324,278,106,866 3,980,819,536,160 4,356,329,296,669 5,959,718,262,199 
South 
Korea 308,185,041,249 329,885,864,344 516,282,942,110 575,928,909,990 1,049,235,951,187 1,129,598,273,324 
India 274,842,348,164 293,262,352,349 423,160,419,466 523,968,561,872 1,238,700,195,725 1,841,709,755,679 
Indonesia 128,167,999,847 139,116,270,052 215,748,854,647 195,660,611,034 432,216,737,775 878,043,027,882 
Russia 509,381,638,906 460,205,414,726 404,926,534,140 345,110,438,694 1,299,705,764,824 2,014,774,938,342 
Turkey 151,041,248,184 159,095,003,188 189,834,649,111 232,534,560,775 647,155,133,932 789,257,487,307 
Germany 1,808,603,417,796 2,064,370,695,053 2,157,229,866,907 2,006,587,615,283 3,323,807,412,152 3,428,130,624,839 
France 1,245,406,348,099 1,372,967,781,908 1,421,492,020,679 1,452,030,303,030 2,582,389,733,356 2,612,878,387,760 
UK 1,066,458,553,792 1,106,226,746,227 1,384,119,187,950 1,620,900,779,377 2,857,080,828,858 2,471,783,570,300 
Italy 1,200,715,302,564 1,271,956,871,335 1,198,654,411,766 1,225,176,959,595 2,127,180,496,503 2,014,669,579,720 
Saudi 
Arabia 131,335,915,473 136,304,139,411 164,993,858,632 188,551,196,399 415,909,018,143 711,049,600,000 
Australia 325,581,979,436 325,389,525,494 435,828,768,195 394,442,235,245 853,854,910,890 1,532,407,884,934 
Table 8, GDP Current $ 
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Turkey 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 
Germany 0.29 0.32 0.25 0.18 0.23 0.21 
France 0.2 0.21 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.16 
UK 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.2 0.15 
Italy 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.12 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Australia 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.09 
 
 
Figure 4, Weighted GDP 
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Figure 5, Weighted GDP, without United States 
GDP Per Capita 
 If a large GDP is the sign of a large market, a large GDP per capita is the sign of a rich market. 
And while a large GDP is not guarantee of power, neither is a large GDP per capita. Thus, the richest 
country by GDP per capita, Monaco during the time surveyed, is undoubtedly one of the weaker 
countries in the world, seeing as it has no real military to speak of and is only a handful of square 
kilometers. Indeed, if Monaco wished to become a great power, it would have severe difficulties with 
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that, seeing as it has no large population and no natural resources. What a large GDP per capita is good 
at showing is the standard of living of a country, and the excess wealth.39  
 There is much debate over whether economies should be compared with current dollars or in 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Declinists in particular prefer PPP, as it tends to make poorer states’ 
economies look larger than when viewed in current dollars, as it attempts to correct for cheaper costs in 
developing countries. It is true that when examining per capita income for the basis of examining the 
standard of living, the PPP per capita is the one to look at. However, when examining the surplus wealth 
of states – that is, how much money per citizen that a state can spend on expensive high-technology 
products such as satellites, warships, and iPhones – it is better to examine per capita by current dollars, 
as it is on the open market that such products are bought, rather than at depressed local prices.40 
Table 10, GDP per capita, Current Dollars 
GDP per capita, 
current $ 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 3,346 3,557 3,636 2,440 5,930 7,943 
U.S. 24,405 25,493 31,573 38,175 48,070 49,854 
Canada 21,234 20,320 21,260 23,425 43,249 51,554 
Mexico 3,578 4,051 4,913 7,032 9,191 9,717 
Brazil 2,677 2,526 5,219 2,811 7,194 12,576 
Argentina 5,736 6,825 8,205 2,712 6,630 10,952 
China 330 363 774 1,135 2,651 5,447 
Japan 28,541 31,014 34,295 31,236 34,095 46,135 
South Korea 7,123 7,555 11,235 12,094 21,590 22,388 
India 310 324 427 487 1,069 1,534 
Indonesia 705 752 1,078 910 1,871 3,471 
Russia 3,427 3,095 2,749 2,375 9,146 13,284 
Turkey 2,751 2,850 3,144 3,576 9,312 10,605 
Germany 22,604 25,605 26,297 24,326 40,403 44,315 
France 21,268 23,330 23,706 23,494 40,342 42,522 
UK 18,571 19,212 23,734 27,322 46,848 39,503 
                                                          
39
 On the importance of surplus wealth for power, see Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations (1956) 
40
 For a good overview of the debate about PPP versus current dollars, look at Jeffrey Frankel, “China is not yet 
number one,” (2014) at http://www.voxeu.org/article/china-not-yet-number-one 
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Italy 21,155 22,395 21,070 21,435 35,826 36,148 
Saudi Arabia 7,846 7,895 8,656 8,639 16,049 24,116 
Australia 18,837 18,599 23,537 20,072 40,629 62,126 
Monaco 83,727 91,651 90,909 88,996 170,633 163,026 
 
Table 11, GDP per capita, Weighted 
GDP per capita, 
weighted 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 
U.S. 0.29 0.28 0.35 0.43 0.28 0.31 
Canada 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.32 
Mexico 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.06 
Brazil 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.08 
Argentina 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.07 
China 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Japan 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.35 0.2 0.28 
South Korea 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.14 
India 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Indonesia 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Russia 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.08 
Turkey 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 
Germany 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.27 
France 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.26 
UK 0.22 0.21 0.26 0.31 0.27 0.24 
Italy 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.22 
Saudi Arabia 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.15 
Australia 0.22 0.2 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.38 
Monaco 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
As Figure 7 shows, there has again been a dramatic increase in GDP per capita wealth among 
most of the countries of the world. However, again, this picture is skewed unless we look at the relative 
changes. As Monaco is merely the base line, it has been removed from the graph, to better examine the 
changes. The major Western economies have not shifted around too much, with all of them going up in 
2002, but declining back to their normal relative levels by 2011, after the 2007 Great Recession, with the 
sole exception of Australia, who is now the highest ranked G-20 country. The BRIC countries can hardly 
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be seen on the graph, as they are still so far beneath the Western countries. In size, the BRICs may be 
catching up, but in terms of excess wealth, they are still far behind Europe and Japan.  
 
Figure 6, Weighted GDP per capita, Without Monaco 
Balance of Economy 
 There remain four other indicators of economic strength, all of which together go to show the 
overall balance of the economy. They are: Services (value added), Manufacturing (value added), Market 
Capitalization, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). An economy strong in one, but weak in the others, is 
fundamentally unbalanced, though it may still be one of great strength.  
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Services (Value Added) 
Services is a very broad category, including hotels and restaurants, transport, government, 
financial, professional, educational, and health services. It is typically thought of as the more “mature” 
part of an economy, the post-industrial sector, as it involves such things as financial management, 
investment banking, consulting, “start-up” software firms, and other sophisticated jobs. It is thus much 
more common for “developed” countries to have a high amount of services value added, although, as 
the graphs show, the BRICs are starting to get a fair share, as well. 
 
Table 12, Services, Value Added, Current Dollars 
Services (VA), 
current $ 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South 
Africa 62,722,655,291 72,007,010,310 86,185,824,079 63,933,516,411 167,222,564,055 246,682,881,864 
U.S. 4,174,400,000,000 4,474,800,000,000 5,955,900,000,000 8,008,000,000,000 10,505,000,000,000 11,511,800,000,000 
Canada 377,628,524,046 368,675,436,419 393,054,311,715 455,312,559,740 889,395,773,205 960,659,485,142 
Mexico 185,364,853,749 216,834,924,309 280,497,820,292 446,080,544,609 607,860,899,005 681,558,957,200 
Brazil 198,969,925,297 183,783,797,145 527,621,726,321 288,127,196,424 782,877,931,238 1,414,408,374,178 
Argentina 114,896,699,523 144,875,039,318 174,668,250,000 54,641,401,682 134,318,766,215 235,316,688,350 
China 127,824,046,686 146,897,964,536 325,557,926,710 602,865,109,894 1,463,712,205,061 3,175,826,483,041 
Japan 2,144,902,645,571 2,378,366,928,690 2,843,949,785,032 2,762,572,973,490 3,066,552,303,956 4,256,639,518,857 
South 
Korea 137,823,004,023 152,069,429,322 246,283,677,953 305,036,887,834 564,779,286,744 582,845,159,168 
India 113,127,933,873 121,219,332,988 185,839,845,750 257,277,805,999 599,914,946,267 971,286,511,888 
Indonesia 52,986,490,063 57,980,562,150 85,391,074,076 78,421,994,366 170,657,214,747 323,178,513,783 
Russia 186,990,606,080 224,238,367,451 204,874,675,886 186,013,278,530 658,600,521,060 952,067,228,367 
Turkey 75,049,320,975 79,728,289,778 97,552,518,862 121,828,922,505 358,898,554,762 425,783,404,702 
Germany 1,018,503,241,014 1,184,871,634,314 1,321,227,159,937 1,258,055,712,404 2,042,680,506,626 2,156,643,815,789 
France 776,430,763,865 868,666,047,088 927,909,642,616 984,134,293,243 1,784,700,125,096 1,940,935,520,333 
UK 635,984,126,984 671,872,586,873 855,947,937,132 1,072,149,280,576 1,957,120,446,924 1,610,505,890,769 
Italy 711,073,540,787 759,192,871,335 726,971,479,751 769,620,037,726 1,345,139,734,212 1,399,257,061,449 
Saudi 
Arabia 60,468,355,181 58,711,346,123 72,704,405,806 81,872,795,511 142,220,651,014 229,242,666,667 
Australia 199,138,215,211 200,959,009,459 275,611,989,357 252,434,596,065 548,878,071,759 893,990,591,325 
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Table 13, Services, Value Added, Weighted 
Services (VA), 
weighted 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
U.S. 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Canada 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 
Mexico 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Brazil 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.12 
Argentina 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 
China 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.28 
Japan 0.51 0.53 0.48 0.34 0.29 0.37 
South Korea 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
India 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.08 
Indonesia 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Russia 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.08 
Turkey 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Germany 0.24 0.26 0.22 0.16 0.19 0.19 
France 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.17 
UK 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.14 
Italy 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.1 0.13 0.12 
Saudi Arabia 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Australia 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.08 
  
As Figure 7 shows, Western European countries have declined slightly in relative strength to America 
with regards to services value added, Japan has declined dramatically, China has gone up dramatically, 
and the other BRICs have gone up slightly. The remaining countries have gone up significantly compared 
to where they were, but hardly at all compared to the growth of the United States.  
This is, again, a situation where a graph can explain better when the United States has been 
removed, as its position skews the whole graph. Figure 7 includes the United States, while Figure 8 
removes it to better show the relative changes of the European countries and China. 
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Figure 7, Weighted Services (Value Added) 
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Figure 8, Weighted Services (Value Added), without United States 
Manufacturing, Value Added 
 It is in manufacturing where the decline of the West is most apparent. In dollars the Western 
countries have barely grown, while in relative weights they have declined. We also see the United States 
being overtaken for the first time, by China, as the Chinese manufacturing growth was truly explosive in 
the time surveyed. This decline may not necessarily be a problem, as it may merely be the progression 
of Western economies past the industrial into the post-industrial, but it does show an unbalancing of 
Western economies, as they become more reliant on others for production capabilities. 
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Table 14, Manufacturing Value Added, Current Dollars 
Manufacturing 
(VA) Current $ 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 25,132,230,011 26,332,969,898 27,041,023,173 19,374,244,203 43,211,104,038 46,230,118,649 
U.S. 1,103,821,517,238 1,143,125,586,210 1,339,645,931,034.00 1,449,900,000,000 1,793,000,000,000 1,800,500,000,000 
Canada 87,579,645,631 82,659,055,183 106,210,457,894 132,983,370,209 178,226,422,121 184,551,250,000 
Mexico 59,213,029,331 67,325,147,248 96,021,125,229 123,045,980,114 174,399,210,797 191,356,339,278 
Brazil 89,965,540,541 84,571,870,087 128,442,511,633 86,108,547,286 200,106,485,425 308,125,382,458 
Argentina 46,265,968,740 50,009,186,273 53,382,000,000 20,762,903,468 50,975,738,515 84,100,657,106 
China 123,278,969,052 138,364,465,548 316,112,776,897 539,028,463,877 1,149,720,335,327 2,103,981,870,470 
Japan 903,997,987,485 951,343,112,436 961,701,021,897 853,194,288,105 879,499,634,832 1,091,175,291,317 
South Korea 76,366,400,764 79,406,520,208 121,376,762,081 147,635,132,300 256,775,175,946 314,176,553,406 
India 38,053,329,718 40,926,248,454 61,736,821,009 85,129,242,174 181,994,005,729 250,844,382,924 
Indonesia 27,369,354,808 30,550,957,835 57,805,514,905 66,329,892,802 116,907,767,203 205,935,149,537 
Russia 33,000,000,000 62000000000 72,546,072,714 61,829,504,537 196,445,746,854 251,357,950,303 
Turkey 33,488,741,125 34,423,526,378 40,938,951,942 53,719,124,525 108,875,054,110 125,779,044,646 
Germany 451,915,144,372 484,708,829,054 438,822,467,855 492,189,616,253 709,557,947,985 630,320,289,473 
France 195,734,157,725 211,488,086,077 208,848,912,244 227,906,320,542 289,709,815,257 128,294,625,539 
UK 198,835,978,836 201,421,551,422 245,985,592,665 236,478,367,347 309,595,175,400 232,141,153,846 
Italy 241,196,077,511 248,433,236,449 232,315,297,863 258,746,173,491 359,596,686,779 307,727,062,297 
Saudi Arabia 11,250,734,554 12,300,134,161 16,648,865,696 19,460,266,394 41,344,450,374 67,200,800,000 
Australia 41,271,485,755 41,267,399,831 54,053,059,947 50,687,827,606 79,506,948,261 103,153,670,633 
 
Table 15, Manufacturing Value Added, Weighted 
Manufacturing 
(VA) Weighted 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
U.S. 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 
Canada 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.09 
Mexico 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.09 
Brazil 0.08 0.07 0.1 0.06 0.11 0.15 
Argentina 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 
China 0.11 0.12 0.24 0.37 0.64 1 
Japan 0.82 0.83 0.72 0.59 0.49 0.52 
South Korea 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.1 0.14 0.15 
India 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.1 0.12 
Indonesia 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.1 
Russia 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.12 
Turkey 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 
Germany 0.41 0.42 0.33 0.34 0.4 0.3 
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France 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.06 
UK 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.11 
Italy 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.2 0.15 
Saudi Arabia 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Australia 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 
 
 
Figure 9, Weighted, Manufacturing Value Added 
Market Capitalization 
 There are two ways in which money can be invested into corporations: passive financial 
investment and direct investment. The market capitalization tells us both how much passive financial 
investment has been accruing, but also how much the companies in the country are worth. It is another 
good indicator of the size of a country’s market, and the level of sophistication. 
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 As Table 17 shows, once again Japan has had tremendously weak growth, as the stagnation 
crisis hit their markets quite hard. European markets have advanced well in dollar amounts, but have 
again fallen behind the impressive American performance. The BRICs have had substantial growth, but 
only China’s has notably surpassed the Europeans. The remaining G-20 countries have had decent 
percentage growth, but are still insignificant compared to the American market. Again there is a graph 
without the United States, to better show the data. 
 
Table 16, Market Capitalization, Current Dollars 
Market 
Cap., 
Current $ 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South 
Africa 167,999,995,904 103,999,995,904 232,069,000,000 184,622,110,000 833,547,930,000 522,974,990,085 
U.S. 4,090,000,048,128 4,489,999,810,560 11,308,779,000,000 11,098,101,530,000 19,947,283,820,000 15,640,707,100,000 
Canada 267,000,004,608 243,000,000,512 567,635,000,000 575,316,000,000 2,186,550,151,976 1,906,589,246,256 
Mexico 98,200,002,560 139,000,004,608 156,595,000,000 103,136,570,000 397,724,640,000 408,691,313,159 
Brazil 42,800,001,024 45,299,998,720 255,478,000,000 123,807,260,000 1,370,376,600,000 1,228,969,170,883 
Argentina 18,499,999,744 18,599,999,488 59,252,000,000 103,433,960,000 86,684,200,000 43,579,790,892 
China 2,030,000,000 18,300,000,256 206,366,000,000 463,079,980,000 6,226,305,290,000 3,389,098,223,398 
Japan 3,129,999,884,288 2,399,999,885,312 2,216,699,000,000 2,126,075,000,000 4,453,474,908,957 3,540,684,600,000 
South 
Korea 96,399,998,976 106,999,996,416 46,052,000,000 249,638,620,000 1,123,632,540,000 994,301,734,995 
India 47,700,000,768 65,100,001,280 128,466,000,000 131,010,920,000 1,819,100,600,000 1,015,370,000,000 
Indonesia 6,819,999,744 12,000,000,000 29,105,000,000 29,991,370,000 211,692,970,000 390,106,865,178 
Russia 244,000,000 218,000,000 128,207,000,000 124,197,830,000 1,503,010,900,000 796,375,801,262 
Turkey 15,699,999,744 9,930,000,384 61,090,000,000 33,957,980,000 286,572,050,000 201,817,335,222 
Germany 392,999,993,344 347,999,993,856 825,233,000,000 691,124,490,616 2,105,505,641,000 1,184,458,631,443 
France 347,999,993,856 351,000,002,560 674,368,000,000 966,961,500,000 2,771,216,780,227 1,568,729,793,722 
UK 988,000,026,624 926,999,969,792 1,996,225,000,000 1,864,262,218,287 3,858,505,426,696 2,903,178,225,658 
Italy 159,000,002,560 128,999,997,440 344,665,000,000 480,629,656,837 1,072,691,504,606 431,470,759,629 
Saudi 
Arabia 48,199,999,488 54,999,998,464 59,386,000,000 74,855,370,000 515,110,770,000 338,873,294,908 
Australia 148,999,995,392 145,000,005,632 295,784,843,900 378,845,655,724 1,298,429,048,000 1,198,163,542,400 
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Table 17, Market Capitalization, Weighted 
Market 
Cap, 
Weighted 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South 
Africa 
0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 
U.S. 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Canada 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.12 
Mexico 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Brazil 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.08 
Argentina 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 0 
China 0 0 0.02 0.04 0.31 0.22 
Japan 0.77 0.53 0.2 0.19 0.22 0.23 
South 
Korea 
0.02 0.02 0 0.02 0.06 0.06 
India 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.06 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 
Russia 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.05 
Turkey 0 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 
Germany 0.1 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.08 
France 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.1 
UK 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19 
Italy 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 
Australia 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.08 
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Figure 10 Weighted Market Capitalization 
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Figure 11, Weighted Market Capitalization, without United States 
Foreign Direct Investment 
 The other form of investment, FDI, are investments not simply for financial gain, but rather to 
acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock). It thus includes mergers and 
acquisitions, building factories, loaning to companies, and other active investments.  FDI can be quite 
helpful in improving infrastructure and bringing over high-technology jobs, and is a good indicator of the 
attractiveness of a country’s markets, as well as a sign of continued growth in the future. 
FDI can shift quickly due to many factors, leaving a graph that is not as linear as the others, but 
overall we notice many of the same trends we’ve observed elsewhere: exponential growth in China, 
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strong growth in the other BRICs, the continued prominence of America, and substantial decline in 
Western European states. 
Table 18, Foreign Direct Investment, Current Dollars 
FDI, 
Current $ 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South 
Africa 254,133,622 3,358,018 3,810,543,923 1,479,804,589 6,586,792,253 4,139,289,123 
U.S. 23,180,000,000 19,810,000,000 105,590,000,000 84,370,000,000 340,065,000,000 252,536,000,000 
Canada 2,874,387,248 4,776,794,694 11,522,842,174 22,053,021,959 119,940,183,815 40,131,613,267 
Mexico 4,742,000,000 4,393,000,000 12,829,800,000 23,932,305,855 31,552,084,170 23,553,049,050 
Brazil 1,103,000,000 2,061,000,000 19,650,000,000 16,590,204,193 44,579,492,464 71,538,657,409 
Argentina 2,439,000,000 4,430,977,523 9,160,272,052 2,148,910,000 6,473,150,000 10,719,930,945 
China 4,366,000,000 11,156,000,000 44,237,000,000 49,307,976,629 156,249,335,203 280,072,219,150 
Japan 1,285,720,115 2,759,977,744 3,200,076,742 9,087,241,612 22,912,932,619 79,081,205 
South 
Korea 1,179,800,000 728,300,000 2,844,200,000 2,392,300,000 1,784,400,000 4,836,500,000 
India 73,537,638 276,512,439 3,577,330,042 5,626,039,508 25,227,740,887 36,498,654,598 
Indonesia 1,482,000,000 1,777,000,000 4,677,000,000 145,085,549 6,928,480,000 19,241,252,762 
Russia NA 1,161,000,000 4,864,643,273 3,461,131,800 55,873,700,000 55,083,600,000 
Turkey 810,000,000 844,000,000 805,000,000 1,082,000,000 22,047,000,000 16,047,000,000 
Germany 4,748,284,117 -2,117,171,191 12,796,405,657 53,605,269,463 28,859,727,354 42,787,029,626 
France 15,152,742,090 21,839,501,253 23,047,924,755 49,568,692,711 93,071,273,731 40,832,023,979 
UK 16,451,468,252 16,558,927,717 37,505,198,184 25,531,788,976 240,539,656,380 36,243,797,828 
Italy 2,400,685,993 3,104,520,914 3,699,857,612 14,699,160,477 40,042,891,550 28,002,522,666 
Saudi 
Arabia 160,000,000 -78,933,333 3,039,466,667 -614,133,333 24,333,811,514 16,308,280,000 
Australia 4,312,358,476 5,699,133,705 7,631,273,090 16,991,776,868 45,305,020,875 66,271,163,219 
 
Table 19, Foreign Direct Investment, Weighted 
FDI, 
weighted 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 0.01 0 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 
U.S. 1 0.91 1 1 1 0.9 
Canada 0.12 0.22 0.11 0.26 0.35 0.14 
Mexico 0.2 0.2 0.12 0.28 0.09 0.08 
Brazil 0.05 0.09 0.19 0.2 0.13 0.26 
Argentina 0.11 0.2 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.04 
China 0.19 0.51 0.42 0.58 0.46 1 
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Japan 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.07 0 
South Korea 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 
India 0 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.13 
Indonesia 0.06 0.08 0.04 0 0.02 0.07 
Russia NA 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.2 
Turkey 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 
Germany 0.2 -0.1 0.12 0.64 0.08 0.15 
France 0.65 1 0.22 0.59 0.27 0.15 
UK 0.71 0.76 0.36 0.3 0.71 0.13 
Italy 0.1 0.14 0.04 0.17 0.12 0.1 
Saudi Arabia 0.01 0 0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.06 
Australia 0.19 0.26 0.07 0.2 0.13 0.24 
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Figure 12, Weighted FDI 
Total Economy 
 The cumulative economic score is determined by adding together the weighted GDP, GDP per 
capita, and half the balanced-economy indicators, i.e. E = GDP + GDP PC + [(SVA + MVA + MC + FDI) / 2]. 
 We again see the trends we have seen throughout. Over the two decades since the end of the 
Cold War, Japan has dropped in relative strength dramatically, while China has risen tremendously. The 
European states have continued to grow, but relative to the United States they have declined 
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substantially. India, Russia, and Brazil have all grown substantially, but nowhere near as much as China, 
and they are still below the European states. 
Table 20, Total Economy Score 
Total Economy 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
U.S. 329 324 335 343 328 319 
Canada 53 47 46 45 67 65 
Mexico 25 27 24 37 26 26 
Brazil 23 20 36 24 32 53 
Argentina 19 24 21 7 12 15 
China 23 39 49 68 104 179 
Japan 199 161 160 133 104 121 
South Korea 23 21 26 29 33 35 
India 8 11 15 15 26 32 
Indonesia 8 9 9 6 10 18 
Russia 16 18 13 12 35 37 
Turkey 9 10 9 8 17 21 
Germany 94 93 91 105 86 84 
France 101 119 73 87 79 66 
UK 103 103 84 84 110 68 
Italy 71 71 55 60 61 54 
South Africa 11 9 11 7 9 11 
Saudi Arabia 13 13 15 13 19 26 
Australia 43 44 41 42 45 71 
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Figure 13, Weighted Economy Total 
Innovation 
 While having a strong economy is important, it is also important what one does with the wealth 
created. If all the gains of an economy are merely spent on necessity or luxury goods, a country will not 
be as strong as a country that is investing its wealth into innovation. Innovation provides countries with 
power through reducing their dependence on others, expanding economic gains through producing 
desirable goods and services, and improved military advantages.41 
                                                          
41
 On the importance of innovation for national power there are many excellent sources: see, for example, Tellis et 
al., Measuring Power in a Postindustrial World (2000) chapter 4; Nicole Bosquet, “From Hegemony to Competition: 
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 Innovation is also one of the more difficult areas to measure. In this formula, I look at patent 
applications, money spent on research and design, and receipts from intellectual property. 
Unfortunately, data are rather slim on this topic, at least in the earlier years. Thus, the innovation 
variables change over the course of the time surveyed. This allows the later years to be more specific 
than the earlier ones, but does lead to a rougher picture of trends over time. 
Patent Applications under the PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty)42 
 A patent application is no guarantee that a patent will be granted, and the PCT does not actually 
grant patents itself – that is the prerogative of each national and regional patent organization. Still, 
patent applications are a good sign of the progress made by a country’s researchers, in terms of 
quantity. This is no guarantee of quality, of course, but is an indicator of the amount of work being put 
into research. 
 Patent applications are one place where Japan has not declined, but rather continued to grow, 
relative to the United States China has, again, a large increase. Most of the remaining countries have 
risen a small amount, with the exception of the UK which, while continuing to grow, has declined from 
22% to 12%, relative to the United States. 
Table 21, Patent Applications, Total 
Patent 
Applications 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 15.9 17.1 160.5 384.4 412.4 310.6 
U.S. 10331.5 11893.9 25609.3 39906.7 49921.7 44597.7 
Canada 544.4 591.7 1346.2 2366.7 3033.3 2764.5 
Mexico 2.5 2.8 70.9 126.6 214.7 169.2 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Cycles of the Core?” In Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein (editors), Processes of the World-System 
(1980); William Thompson “Uneven Economic Growth, Systemic Challenges, and Global Wars,” International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27 (1983), p341-355; Joshua Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age 
(1988); William Thompson, “Long Waves, Technological Innovation, and Relative Decline,” International 
Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1990), p201-233; and Michael Beckley, “Economic Development and Military 
Effectiveness,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Amos Perlmutter Prize Essay, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2010), p43-79. 
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Brazil 29.8 40 109.3 229.1 531.1 599.9 
Argentina 0.3 2 9.7 35 84.4 45.7 
China 6.1 7.3 213.1 1316.3 6519.8 17027.2 
Japan 1590.9 1673 5328.6 14889.9 27238.3 39869.1 
South Korea 68.2 96.1 401.2 2590.6 7249.7 10237.1 
India 5.3 6.4 29.1 729.9 1307.3 1730 
Indonesia 0.3 0.8 4 10.2 18.7 16.9 
Russia 197.6 247.6 437 580.4 845 990.6 
Turkey 0.3 0.1 27.4 109.9 378.1 349.9 
Germany 2865.2 3399.5 8875.7 14149.8 18727.1 16054.8 
France 1185.2 1302.9 3130.3 5081.6 6816.3 7334.4 
UK 2242.9 2516.5 3787.2 5940.7 6409.8 5176.4 
Italy 374 461.6 1106.7 2207.7 3345.6 3152.4 
Saudi Arabia 1 1.3 2.9 28.8 46.4 226.1 
Australia 647.8 661.5 1015.3 1768.4 2010.2 1640.4 
 
Table 22, Patent Applications, Weighted 
Patent 
Applications, 
Weighted 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
U.S. 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Canada 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.38 
Japan 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.37 0.55 0.89 
South Korea 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.23 
India 0 0 0 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 
Germany 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.36 
France 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.16 
UK 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.12 
Italy 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 
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Australia 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 
 
Figure 14, Patent Applications under PCT, Weighted 
Research & Development 
 If patents are the outputs of innovation, the inputs are research and development. Tracking the 
money spent on research, whether basic, applied, or experimental, does not equate precisely with 
innovation, but it is one of the better indicators. Money spent now on R&D frequently provides 
exponential gains to the economy later, as well as technological advancements in weaponry and other 
vital sciences. 
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 The data are unfortunately unavailable earlier than 1997 for most countries, and are unavailable 
after that for several others. It is quite remarkable how most R&D is done in a small selection of 
countries, with the majority of countries spending the smallest percentages of others. The R&D numbers 
cited here include both public and private spending. 
 While patent applications have gone down, relatively speaking, in several countries, the relative 
and absolute amount spent on R&D has mostly risen, as more and more countries transition to high-
technology and information based economies. Again, China has had a tremendous growth spurt43, while 
the majority of other countries grow slowly, and the United States remains far above everyone else. 
 
Table 23, Research and Development Spending, Current Dollars 
R&D, 
Current $ 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 892,884,995 844,366,521 2,632,780,000 3,381,950,000 
U.S. 222,099,000,000 248,153,000,000 393,864,000,000 449,975,000,000 
Canada 10,583,100,000 14,987,100,000 27,911,700,000 31,692,800,000 
Mexico 1,653,180,000 3,302,100,000 3,860,800,000 5,419,380,000 
Brazil NA 4,941,370,000 15,035,400,000 26,356,200,000 
Argentina 123,001,000 397,957,118 1,329,920,000 3,043,210,000 
China 6,096,980,000 15,556,000,000 48,916,800,000 151,379,000,000 
Japan 122,377,000,000 124,202,000,000 150,729,000,000 203,226,000,000 
South Korea 12,803,800,000 13,822,300,000 33,680,500,000 40,326,700,000 
India 2,835,170,000 3,720,180,000 9,414,120,000 19,153,800,000 
Indonesia NA NA NA 790,238,725 
Russia 4,211,240,000 4,313,880,000 14,556,700,000 22,565,500,000 
Turkey 930,189,780 1,232,430,000 4,659,520,000 7,261,170,000 
Germany 48,321,900,000 50,164,700,000 84,092,300,000 97,358,900,000 
France 31,130,700,000 32,525,500,000 53,713,700,000 58,789,800,000 
UK 24,222,100,000 29,176,200,000 50,570,300,000 43,750,600,000 
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 Part of the growth spurt in Chinese R&D is due to Chinese law, as China passed a mandate that by 2020, R&D 
expenditures will constitute 2.5% of GDP. See Hao Xin and Gong Yidong, “China Bets on Big Science,” Science, 
March 17, 2006, p1548-1549 
Gallagher 48 
 
 
Italy 12,226,300,000 13,722,000,000 24,888,000,000 25,183,400,000 
Saudi Arabia NA NA 207,954,509 639,944,640 
Australia 6,929,680,000 6,902,740,000 19,638,700,000 37,237,500,000 
  
Table 24, Research and Development Spending, Weighted 
R&D, Weighted 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 0 0 0.01 0.01 
U.S. 1 1 1 1 
Canada 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Mexico 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Brazil 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 
Argentina 0.01 0 0 0.01 
China 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.34 
Japan 0.55 0.5 0.38 0.45 
South Korea 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 
India 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 
Russia 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 
Turkey 0 0 0.01 0.02 
Germany 0.22 0.2 0.21 0.22 
France 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 
UK 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.1 
Italy 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 
Australia 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.08 
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Figure 15, Weighted R&D Spending 
Receipts for Charges of Intellectual Property Use 
 Perhaps the most informative of the innovation indicators is also the one where data have only 
recently become available, unfortunately. While patent applications shows all research, the receipts give 
us an indicator of just which patents are valuable and which are not. These receipts include patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, designs, and franchises.  
 Interestingly enough, while the patents and R&D numbers have declined for the Western 
European countries, with China going far above them, when it comes to actual receipts China has barely 
1% what the United States has, while Germany, France and the UK remain at respectable levels in the 
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teens. This appears to show that while China is spending large sums on research and achieving a 
considerable number of patents, the research that has been done so far has little use to the rest of the 
world.44 Figure 16 does not include the United States, as it skews the graph far too much. 
 
Table 25, Receipts for Intellectual Property Use, Current Dollars 
Receipts for IP Use, 
Current $ 2007 2011 
South Africa 52,913,602 65,767,204 
U.S. 97,802,000,000 120,718,000,000 
Canada 3,835,171,841 3,346,533,785 
Mexico 94,610,580 96,535,890 
Brazil 319,410,000 590,769,563 
Argentina 106,180,000 172,492,048 
China 342,634,075 743,301,698 
Japan 23,228,568,013 28,989,252,521 
South Korea 1,735,100,000 4,335,600,000 
India 163,126,497 302,615,975 
Indonesia 30,690,000 78,800,621 
Russia 351,500,000 555,800,000 
Turkey NA NA 
Germany 8,464,126,147 14,784,193,690 
France 8,841,134,272 16,127,805,584 
UK 16,063,373,930 14,082,476,426 
Italy 1,049,623,867 3,970,640,349 
Saudi Arabia NA NA 
Australia 692,737,815 1,052,348,098 
 
Table 26, Receipts for Intellectual Property Use, Weighted 
IP Receipts, Weighted 2007 2011 
South Africa 0 0 
U.S. 1 1 
Canada 0.04 0.03 
Mexico 0 0 
Brazil 0 0 
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 It seems that if this research was useful, China would have much larger IP receipts than they do, although this 
may be debatable. 
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Argentina 0 0 
China 0 0.01 
Japan 0.24 0.24 
South Korea 0.02 0.04 
India 0 0 
Indonesia 0 0 
Russia 0 0 
Turkey 0 0 
Germany 0.09 0.12 
France 0.09 0.13 
UK 0.16 0.12 
Italy 0.01 0.03 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 
Australia 0.01 0.01 
 
 
Figure 16, Receipts for IP Use, Weighted, Without United States 
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Total Innovation: 
 The total innovation score is a weighted average of the three different indicators. As mentioned 
above, this leads to a rather rough trend, as the variable numbers grow, but more accuracy as the 
indicators grow. 
 As Table 27 shows, the United States stands far above the other countries. Japan gets close, 
when we take into account the receipts for IP use, and China and the western European countries have 
significant portions, but the vast majority of countries in the G-20 simply are not comparable.  
Table 27, Total Innovation 
Total 
Innovation 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
U.S. 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Canada 5 5 10 12 17 16 
Mexico 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Brazil 0 0 0 2 2 2 
Argentina 0 0 1 0 0 0 
China 0 0 2 5 8 24 
Japan 15 14 38 44 39 53 
South Korea 1 1 4 6 9 12 
India 0 0 1 2 2 3 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Germany 28 29 29 28 23 23 
France 11 11 13 13 12 14 
UK 22 21 13 14 14 11 
Italy 4 4 5 6 5 5 
South Africa 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Australia 6 6 4 4 3 4 
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Figure 17, Total Innovation, Weighted 
MILITARY 
 The military part of the formula is simple, merely a measure of military spending, and a 
weighted index of nuclear warheads, combined together.  
Military Spending45 
 Military spending likely understates true differentials in military strength, due to dollars buying 
one state different caliber supplies than others, as many states restrict who may buy their higher-
technology weaponry, but it does help provide a rough picture of the size of a country’s military.  
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 While China has recently increased its military spending quite considerably, it remains far 
behind the United States. Indeed, the United States, as is often noted, spends more than China, Russia, 
the UK, Japan, France, Saudi Arabia, India, Germany, Italy, and Brazil combined; in fact, the United States 
in total spends 42.8% of the total world military spending.46  
Table 28, Military Spending, Current Dollars (Millions) 
Military Spending, 
Current $(M) 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 5,649 4,863 3,406 1,800 4,475 4,596 
U.S. 463,013 489,226 387,258 348,500 604,292 711,402 
Canada 19,008 18,798 14,741 8,200 20,322 23,294 
Mexico 2,787 3,094 3,688 5,600 5,013 6,472 
Brazil 15,783 12,426 21,107 10,200 29,595 36,932 
Argentina 2,527 2,393 2,193 1,500 2,421 4,052 
China 20,833 25,317 26,335 51,000 96,906 146,154 
Japan 49,399 52,486 56,988 39,500 60,574 59,572 
South Korea 15,535 16,439 20,095 13,300 26,773 30,884 
India 17,561 16,783 22,102 13,800 36,664 49,634 
Indonesia 1,769 1,905 2,503 6,600 4,448 5,705 
Russia NA 72,244 36,090 50,800 61,824 78,330 
Turkey 13,607 14,328 18,553 9,200 15,924 17,690 
Germany 67,986 64,656 50,378 33,300 46,060 48,164 
France 70,986 68,753 63,617 40,200 65,691 62,741 
UK 59,508 55,582 46,581 37,300 60,379 60,284 
Italy 37,412 36,337 37,606 25,600 39,736 37,670 
Saudi Arabia 23,478 22,067 24,126 22,200 45,264 48,531 
Australia 15,591 16,046 16,398 8,000 23,947 26,610 
 
Table 29, Military Spending, Weighted 
Military Spending, 
Weighted 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
U.S. 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Canada 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Mexico 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
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Brazil 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 
Argentina 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0.01 
China 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.21 
Japan 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.1 0.08 
South Korea 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
India 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.07 
Indonesia 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Russia NA 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.1 0.11 
Turkey 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Germany 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.1 0.08 0.07 
France 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.09 
UK 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.08 
Italy 0.08 0.07 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.05 
Saudi Arabia 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Australia 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 
 
 
Figure 18, Weighted Military Spending 
Nuclear Weapons47 
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 No look at military strength or hard power could be complete without examining nuclear 
weapons, which, in the words of Cline, provide a state with a protective “nuclear shield” of self-
defense.48  While the weighing system used throughout the rest of this study is the simple one of giving 
the top score a rank of 100 and weighing the rest in relation to that, nuclear weaponry is treated 
differently. As Morgenthau noted: 
 by virtue of [the] destructiveness [of nuclear weapons] a quantitative increase… in contrast to 
conventional ones, does not of necessity signify a corresponding increase in national power. 
Once a nation possesses all the nuclear weapons necessary to destroy all the enemy targets it 
has chosen for destruction, taking all possible contingencies, such as a first strike by the enemy, 
into consideration, additional nuclear weapons will not increase that nation’s power.49 
For this reason, a weight of 100 has been given to both Russia and the United States, as they both have 
enough to destroy any country they wish, and a more moderate 50 for France, the UK, and China. As 
India’s arsenal has grown, so has their score. For the sake of simplicity, this essay only looks at the 
number of nuclear warheads, not the types of delivery systems, although differences here would of 
course be important when directly comparing the power of two nuclear states. 
 
Table 30, Nuclear Warheads, Total 
Nuclear Warheads 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 
      U.S. 19008 13708 10903 10457 5273 4763 
Canada 
      Mexico 
      Brazil 
      Argentina 
      China 234 234 232 235 235 240 
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 Cline, World Power Assessment, p54. Others  
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Japan 
      South Korea 
      India 
   
23 60 90 
Indonesia 
      Russia 29154 26734 15442 10114 5929 4858 
Turkey 
      Germany 
      France 540 540 450 350 300 300 
UK 350 250 203 280 225 225 
Italy 
      Saudi Arabia 
      Australia 
       
Table 31, Nuclear Score 
Nuclear Weighing 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
South Africa 
     U.S. 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Canada 
      Mexico 
      Brazil 
      Argentina 
      China 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Japan 
      South Korea 
     India 
   
10 15 20 
Indonesia 
      Russia 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Turkey 
      Germany 
      France 50 50 50 50 50 50 
UK 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Italy 
      Saudi Arabia 
     Australia 
       
Total Military 
 The total military score has been determined by adding the nuclear weapon score together with 
twice the military spending.  
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 The United States has been the undeniable military superpower since the fall of the USSR. 
Russia has remained far ahead of most other countries due to their impressive store of nuclear 
warheads. China has moved closer to the top in recent years, as they have increased spending, and the 
western European countries have declined slightly as they reduce spending, but most military scores 
have remained relatively stable since 1991.  
Table 32, Military Score 
Military Score 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
U.S. 300 300 300 300 300 300 
Canada 8 8 8 4 6 6 
Mexico 2 2 2 4 2 2 
Brazil 6 6 10 6 10 10 
Argentina 2 0 2 0 0 2 
China 58 60 64 80 82 92 
Japan 22 22 30 22 20 16 
South Korea 6 6 10 8 8 8 
India 8 6 12 18 27 24 
Indonesia 0 0 2 4 2 2 
Russia NA 130 118 130 120 122 
Turkey 6 6 10 6 6 4 
Germany 30 26 26 20 16 14 
France 80 78 82 74 72 68 
UK 74 72 74 72 70 66 
Italy 16 14 20 14 14 10 
South Africa 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Saudi Arabia 10 10 12 12 14 14 
Australia 6 6 8 4 8 8 
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Figure 19, Weighted Total Military 
Total Score: 
 As mentioned above, the final formula to combine all of the indicators, in all of the areas, is as 
follows: 
Relative Hard Power Capacity (RHPC) = Base (B) + Economy (E) + Innovation (I) + Military (M), 
with a possible total score of 1000. 
Table 33, Total Score 
Total Score 1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011 
U.S. 836 829 840 848 834 824 
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Canada 112 106 106 104 126 123 
Mexico 53 55 54 68 55 55 
Brazil 103 100 123 109 123 145 
Argentina 50 53 53 36 44 49 
China 251 269 284 324 365 466 
Japan 245 206 237 208 172 199 
South Korea 33 31 43 46 53 58 
India 102 104 117 125 149 165 
Indonesia 31 32 34 35 38 46 
Russia NA 254 236 245 259 260 
Turkey 27 28 30 26 36 37 
Germany 160 156 154 160 132 128 
France 201 211 177 183 172 157 
UK 206 203 177 176 200 151 
Italy 98 96 87 87 87 76 
South Africa 32 30 32 29 32 34 
Saudi Arabia 48 48 59 57 66 72 
Australia 147 147 144 138 144 168 
 
Gallagher 61 
 
 
 
Figure 20, Weighted Total Score 
Analysis of Data 
 The hypotheses of the declinists and anti-declinists will be examined and evaluated here. 
Following that, several trends will be pointed out and discussed, such as the question of the Rise of the 
BRICs and the power of the G-8 states. 
Evaluation of the Declinist and Anti-Declinist Hypotheses 
To restate the two competing hypotheses, the declinist hypothesis argued that the gap between 
the United States and its nearest competitor has become remarkably smaller, while the anti-declinist 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1991 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011
USA
Canada
Mexico
Brazil
Argentina
China
Japan
South Korea
India
Indonesia
Russia
Turkey
Germany
France
UK
Italy
South Africa
Saudi Arabia
Australia
Gallagher 62 
 
 
hypothesis argued the gap would remain the same or be larger. So, what do the data show? They 
appear to favor the declinist hypotheses, though not by as much as the declinists themselves would 
have one believe. In 1991, the nearest competitor was already China, once the Soviet Union collapsed. 
China had an aggregate score of 251, compared to the United States’ 836. In 2011, China had an 
aggregate score of 466 compared to the United States’ 824. Thus, while in 1991 the United States was 
231% more powerful than China, in 2011 the United States was still more powerful than China by 77%. 
This is certainly a sharp decline in power, but not the disaster (for the United States) that most declinists 
argue.  
Evaluating the Declinist Hypothesis 
  The declinist case rests primarily on the single indicator of GDP growth, as recorded in 
Michael Beckley’s “China’s Century?” anti-declinist article.50 In an interesting twist, however, 
looking only at GDP growth from 1991 to 2011 would favor the anti-declinists, as Japan’s GDP 
was closer to the United States in 1991 than China’s was to the United States in 2011. Still, the 
declinists tend to assume that China’s rapid GDP growth will continue into the future as it has 
now, as can be seen by the quoted articles above titled “This Time It’s Different” and other 
variants.51 While that remains to be seen, it certainly does not appear to be the case that 
“China’s dominance is… in some ways… already here,” as one declinist wrote.52  
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 Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 
(Winter 2011/12), p41-78 
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 See quoted articles in the Introduction of this essay 
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It is also unclear if the “unipolar moment is over,” as the declinists also argue.53 This claim turns 
on what is meant by a unipolar state. The United States in 2011 was still more than 75% powerful than 
its nearest competitor, and 221% more powerful than the second-nearest, Russia. In fact, combining the 
power of both Russia and China together would still not equal the United States, as they would still be 
13% weaker. Considering that the next-closest states are Japan and Australia, who are both allies of the 
United States, it appears that it would be quite difficult for the competitors of the United States to 
“balance” their powers against it. India and Brazil are close behind Australia, but so are France and the 
United Kingdom, with Germany and Canada not far behind them.  
Thus, while the declinist hypothesis appears to be the more accurate one, in their literature they 
have vastly overstated the situation. The United States has declined, but it still is far above the other 
states, unless all of its allies were to abandon it and join forces to balance against it. 
Evaluating the Anti-Declinist Hypothesis 
 As Beckley points out, many of the anti-declinists have also used only a handful of metrics.54 
Beckley himself argues for the anti-declinists, and makes a good case, but he miscalculates the changing 
nature of hard power. He argues that “the United States is now wealthier compared to China than it was 
in 1991” due to the absolute difference, rather than the relative difference. While the GDP gap between 
the United States and China has grown in the United States’ favor ($5,794,531,343,754 in 1991 and 
$8,017,497,370,169 in 2011), the relative difference has gone in China’s favor (China had 6% of the 
United States’ GDP in 1991 and 51% in 2011). Thus, while Beckley sees a 39% increase in GDP, this is an 
increase in absolute dollars, while what matters is the relative decrease of 52%. The United States’ lead 
in GDP has shrunk dramatically since the end of the Cold War.  
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Other Trends 
The Rise of the BRICs 
 The BRICs55 are, as mentioned above, Brazil, Russia, India, and China, a group of countries whose 
growth has been highly advertised over the last decade. The term was originally coined in 2001 by 
Goldman Sachs to draw attention to the possibilities of lucrative investment opportunities, but it soon 
grew into a life of its own.56 During the first decade of the 21st century, the rise of the BRICs was shown 
as proof that the hegemony of the United States and the West was done for, as a new multipolar world 
arose. Commentators have referred to this in a number of catchy ways, from ‘G-Zero’ to ‘Rise of the 
Rest’.57 These theories all pointed to a leveling of power in international relations, where there was no 
clear superpower. 
 What do the data show? For one, it seems rather odd to put the four countries together. All four 
countries have always had a respectable level of hard power capabilities, due to their relatively large 
sizes and populations. Russia and China have, in particular, always been powerful countries due to these 
factors and their stores of nuclear missiles. Since 1991, China has grown 85%, India has grown 62%, 
Brazil has grown 41%, and Russia has grown 2%, relatively speaking. Speaking of these four as one group 
seems slightly misplaced, considering the large differences in growth. It also seems premature to speak 
of a multipolar world or a G-Zero world, as China is the only state that appears to be approaching the 
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 Some include South Africa in this club, but South Africa is so far beneath the others that it has been excluded for 
this essay 
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 Nye, Future of Power, p167 
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United States. This study seems to support the opinion of analysts who have eschewed the classification, 
as it appears that the BRICs do not have much in common except the title.58 
 
Figure 21, weighted total power of BRICs 
 
The G-7 
 While the BRIC countries have gone up, in differing levels, the G-7 of Western Industrialized 
states have not been as successful. While all have gone up in absolute numbers, relative to the United 
States (and to the BRICs), their growth has not been as successful, with only Canada’s total score going 
up (10%).The UK has done the worst, with a decline of 36%, followed by France at 28%, Italy at 26%, 
Japan as 23%, and Germany at 20%. These declines are primarily due to decreased economic growth in 
the wake of the 2007 Great Recession, especially in regards to FDI, as the emerging markets have looked 
more and more attractive to investors. 
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Figure 22, G-7 without United States, weighted total 
 
The Rise of the Rest? 
 The remaining countries in the world have gone up slowly but surely. Australia interestingly has 
a higher score than many BRIC and G-7 countries, primarily due to its large size, but also brought upon 
by its increasing economic strength. While several authors have announced “The Rise of the Rest”, 
where it is not only the BRICs but all non-Western powers that are rising, relative to the United States 
and states of the G-7, this appears to be a premature prediction, as the data appear to show only a 
moderate gain by most non-BRIC states.59 
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Figure 22, rest of world, weighted total 
Discussion and Future Research 
 As mentioned above, the formula constructed in this essay is heavily built upon the past work of 
other scholars. Multivariable power formulas of the type constructed here used to be more common, as 
also mentioned above, but they have been shunted to the side of academia in the last several decades. 
This is quite regrettable, as broad power formulas are indispensable when examining long-time trends 
of many states. The results of these formulas are never exactly precise, and they are thus not useful for 
a strict country-to-country comparison, but they give an excellent rough view of changing power 
dynamics over time. Considering that such long-time trends are the foundation of the declinist and anti-
declinist debate, the disregarding of such formulas seems misguided. This essay hopes to contribute to 
the field by reviving the work of the past and updating it for the present, and by providing the 
groundwork for the future. 
 In the future, it would be beneficial if further research could continue the task of refining the 
formula, possibly by adding further variables. For example, while it is outside the scope of this project to 
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determine an optimal amount of energy resources (an amount in-between the negative of having none 
and the negative of having so much that one suffers from the so-called “resource curse” of a single-
sector economy), if further research were able to determine such an optimal amount, it would probably 
be beneficial to add such a variable into the index. 
 A benefit of dividing the overall variables into four overriding foundations is that further 
variables can easily be added in the future, as shown in this essay through the changing nature of the 
Innovation variables. Keeping the same basic breakdown of 20% base, 40% economy, 10% innovation, 
and 30% military, future research can easily add or subtract variables as deemed beneficial.  
 Future research should continue to work on this model of analyzing national power, rather than 
ignoring this area as many scholars have done. It is vitally important to look at national power 
fluctuations through the scope of time and the breadth of many states: a limited view will give a limited 
picture, which could be quite dangerous for policymakers.60 Thus, future research should work to 
strengthen this model of power to help give the fullest view possible. 
Conclusion 
As Nye is keen to remark, hard power resources are like the cards in a game of poker: just 
because one has the best hand does not guarantee that one will win the game.61 However, as anyone 
who has played poker will attest, it certainly helps. With that said, it must again be reiterated that index 
system explained here, calculated through the hard power formula, should not be used to determine if 
one state is more powerful than another; such calculations should be determined through a much more 
rigorous and detailed analysis of the two states that takes into account the “relational” approach to 
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power, as well as relevant soft and smart power capabilities. This formula and index is, again, only 
supposed to show long term trends of the hard power capabilities between states. 
And the long term trends look clear. China’s hard power resources have grown tremendously 
since the fall of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the post-Cold War era, and the lead the United 
States once held has been shrunk considerably. This does appear to support the declinist hypothesis, but 
it is nowhere near as strong a claim as most declinists have argued. The United States’ lead has shrunk, 
but it is still more powerful than the two closest competitors, China and Russia. While the other BRICs 
have done decently well themselves, they have not advanced nearly enough to declare that we live in a 
multipolar or G-Zero world, where there are several states of near-equal power and no dominant 
players. It is clear that while the United States has lost its lead by several degrees, it is still the supreme 
player in the world. Its military spending surpasses all, its innovation is astounding, its economy is still 
the foundation of the  global marketplace, and its large size and population guarantee it cannot be 
reduced to a bit player anytime soon. The G-7 states of Japan, Canada, and Western Europe have all 
declined slightly in power, but they are still all extremely powerful. Instead of the “Rise of the Rest”, the 
“Rise of the BRICs”, or the “G-Zero”, what we appear to be seeing is simply the rise of China. Whether or 
not this will lead to the United States falling from the peak of the pyramid remains to be seen. As for 
now, the United States’ power leaves it far, far above the nearest competitors.  
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Integration of Faith and Learning 
My faith, my intellectual passions, and the other aspects of my life are all driven by a search for 
truth, while always taking the middle way between extremes. In my faith, this comes out by being an 
Episcopalian, balanced between the Catholics and the Protestants. In my scholarship, this comes out in 
attempting to be as balanced and accurate as possible. In International Relations, balance is crucial in 
holding back from making sweeping claims and inventing large theories that inevitably do more harm 
than good. Small, focused, empirically based and logically sound theories are the best approach to take.  
My Episcopalian faith has also helped guide me to the study of International Relations in 
general, as my faith propels me in an attempt to better the world. A good world, in my view, is one with 
law, order, freedom and justice. Through the study of International Relations, we are able to find out 
how to best bring about peace, stability, and order to the world. The fruit of the study of International 
Relations truly is a better world.  
This desire for balance and for bettering the world has deeply guided the work of this project. 
The desire for balance is apparent in the conclusion I reach, that the truth regarding declinism is located 
between the declinists and anti-declinists, and the whole project is guided by an attempt to better the 
world. An accurate understanding of power dynamics is crucial to understand the place of states in the 
world, which is vital for decision makers, as noted above.  
Ultimately, the self-picture my faith provides me of being a steward of God to the world also 
propels me in a never-ending search for excellence, as part of the job of a steward is to carry out one’s 
duties as well as one can. This desire for excellence in everything, seen as a task from God, has been a 
crucial part of this project, providing impetus during the low periods of this project and pleasure during 
the high periods. Whether or not excellence has been achieved, the desire has undoubtedly helped this 
project.  
